The character of Pericles; and why democracy must not be the ruling power of a state

From Plutarch’s Life of Pericles, John Dryden translation:

He was indeed a character deserving our high admiration not only for his equitable and mild temper, which all along in the many affairs of his life, and the great animosities which he incurred, he constantly maintained; but also for the high spirit and feeling which made him regard it, the noblest of all his honours that, in the exercise of such immense power, he never had gratified his envy or his passion, nor ever had treated any enemy as irreconcilably opposed to him. And to me it appears that this one thing gives that otherwise childish and arrogant title a fitting and becoming significance; so dispassionate a temper, a life so pure and unblemished, in the height of power and place, might well be called Olympian, in accordance with our conceptions of the divine beings, to whom, as the natural authors of all good and of nothing evil, we ascribe the rule and government of the world. Not as the poets represent, who, while confounding us with their ignorant fancies, are themselves confuted by their own poems and fictions, and call the place, indeed, where they say the gods make their abode, a secure and quiet seat, free from all hazards and commotions, untroubled with winds or with clouds, and equally through all time illumined with a soft serenity and a pure light as though such were a home most agreeable for a blessed and immortal nature; and yet, in the meanwhile, affirm that the gods themselves are full of trouble and enmity and anger and other passions, which no way become or belong to even men that have any understanding. But this will, perhaps seem a subject fitter for some other consideration, and that ought to be treated of in some other place.

The course of public affairs after his death produced a quick and speedy sense of the loss of Pericles. Those who, while he lived, resented his great authority, as that which eclipsed themselves, presently after his quitting the stage, making trial of other orators and demagogues, readily acknowledged that there never had been in nature such a disposition as his was, more moderate and reasonable in the height of that state he took upon him, or more grave and impressive in the mildness which he used. And that invidious arbitrary power, to which formerly they gave the name of monarchy and tyranny, did then appear to have been the chief bulwark of public safety; so great a corruption and such a flood of mischief and vice followed which he, by keeping weak and low, had withheld from notice, and had prevented from attaining incurable height through a licentious impunity.

A reader writes:

I’ve read and reread your post, but what do you mean by “democracy must not be the ruling power of the state”? Are you saying that monarchy is generally preferable? I understand that Julius Caesar was relatively benevolent on the throne, but was succeeded by Augustus and crew with unhappy results. I think it’s implied that Pericles’ benevolence was the exception to the rule which naturally is rooted in human nature. Surely you must be meaning something else that I’m missing.

My reply:

This references an argument I’ve made over and over in various ways, with the proper qualifications so that I would not be misunderstood. This time I referenced the same idea without the qualifications, and that’s a problem.

Let’s start by putting it this way. As used to be the common understanding in America, democratic popular representation is one part of our federal republican system, not the whole of it. The system was intended as a mixed system, with power distributed in various parts of the government. It is not simply a “democracy,” meaning direct rule by the people. In the America I grew up in, moreover, it was understood that pure democracy was a bad thing. True, the people are the sovereign, but they do not in the ordinary course of government exercise sovereign power. Power is distributed among the states and the federal government, and among the branches of the federal government, to prevent the exercise of power from being concentrated in any one body, including the people.

One of the inadequacies of unadulterated democracy is that it contains no principle of leadership. It is, as Plato says in Book VI of The Republic, like a ship in which there is no captain, and the crew is rioting. Plutarch is telling us that the Athenian democracy’s inherent tendency toward disorder was held in check by Pericles’ leadership which he exercised virtuously. Leadership is an indispensable need of government, yet it is not provided by democracy. This demonstrates how democracy by itself is insufficient and destructive; it needs to be supplemented by other principles.

Just as democracy cannot be the ruling principle, I argue in a somewhat similar way that liberalism, in order not to be destructive, must operate within a social and cultural order that is not itself liberal. Liberalism cannot be the highest or ruling value of the society, it must be subordinated to moral and cultural considerations.

For example, pure liberalism says that we cannot discriminate between European immigrants and non-Europeans, we must admit everyone from all nations and cultures on an equal numerical basis; this is the basic principle of our immigration law since 1965. By contrast, a liberalism guided by cultural considerations would recognize that our society is not merely “liberal,” but is a distinct historical nation and culture, and that turning our society into a non-European society through non-discriminatory immigration is not compatible with its continued existence as a distinct nation and culture.

Posted by Lawrence Auster at March 13, 2006 11:53 PM | Send