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Going deeper into President Bush’s handling of the NIE
I have suggested in previous entries that President Bush allowed the National Intelligence Estimate on the Iranian nuclear program to be published because he had given up on doing anything about Iran, and the NIE gave him an “out.” An even more unattractive possibility, raised by Caroline Glick in a devastating column last week, is that Bush, as part of a pro-Muslim tilt of which the Annapolis conference was also a part, had been planning all along to let go of the Iran nuclear issue and leave Israel twisting in the wind. In a blog entry posted December 5 at Commentary’s blog, Contentions, Norman Podhoretz has a more honorable—and, up to a point, more plausible—explanation for the president’s behavior. Podhoretz says that Bush permitted the NIE to be published simply because its intelligence that Iran had stopped enriching uranium for military purposes in 2003 was solid, and therefore he couldn’t suppress the report. Podhoretz also points out that notwithstanding the findings of the NIE, Bush in his press conference last week tried hard to keep open the option of a military strike against Iran. Yet Podhoretz further adds, with sadness, that the political reality created by the NIE is that the military option is now practically closed. However, Podhoretz also states that Israeli intelligence believes that Iran resumed uranium enrichment in 2005. The contradictory realities indicated by Podhoretz raise a troubling question that Podhoretz himself does not ask. If the Israelis have intelligence that Iran resumed uranium enrichment in 2005, why didn’t Bush say this? Why did Bush endorse an untrue report that hamstrings him vis a vis Iran? Podhoretz and other Bush supporters would probably answer that the president could not mention the Israeli finding, as that would amount to the president’s disagreeing with his own government. That answer leads to a further implication: that a president against his will can be hemmed in and tied down by his own bureaucracy. Namely, if the intelligence community writes a report which contains one likely truth that goes against the president’s policy (i.e., that Iran stopped uranium enrichment in 2003), but which also fails to mention a contrary likely truth that would support the president’s policy (i.e., that Iran resumed uranium enrichment in 2005), then the president must publish this incomplete and misleading report or else be accused of suppressing the truth. Thus unaccountable agencies of which the president is the supposed head can make the president their creature. Such is the miserable prospect with which Podhoretz’s account leaves us. Given that Podhoretz’s lodestar is to champion Bush no matter what, it is not surprising that he tells the story in such a way as to portray Bush as both honest in his conduct and blameless for a situation over which he had no control. But our analysis needn’t stop with Podhoretz’s picture of presidential honesty combined with presidential helplessness. There was an alternative course for Bush that would have been even more truthful and radically more effective. Bush on reading the NIE could have told the intelligence community that he would publish their report, but not in its present, incomplete, and misleading form. He could have told them that the information indicating that Iran resumed enrichment in 2005 must be given equal weight with the information that Iran stopped enrichment in 2003. The intelligence community would have taken a few days to make the necessary amendments, and then the NIE could have been published. In this hypothetical report, instead of the opening paragraph being, “We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Teheran halted its nuclear weapons program,” the opening paragraph would have been, “We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Teheran halted its nuclear weapons program. However, we also judge with high confidence that in 2005 Iran resumed its nuclear weapons program.” Bush would thus be neither suppressing the intelligence about the 2003 suspension, nor failing to present the intelligence about the 2005 resumption. The alternative scenario presented above reveals the incompleteness of Podhoretz’s account. Podhoretz avoids any critical assessment of Bush’s conduct. But the reality that Podhoretz paints and accepts is that Bush allowed his political enemies in the government to box him in and thus destroy his ability to prevent the Iranians from developing nuclear weapons. Assuming that Bush had not lost his will or his mind, it didn’t have to be that way. Which means that Podhoretz is excusing what is, at best, a catastrophic failure of leadership.
Paul T. writes from Canada:
But what if Bush believes the Israelis are lying? or at least in error?LA replies:
Yes, it’s possible that Bush fully accepts, as a neutral, objective conclusion, the idea that Iran has stopped making nuclear weapons and has not resumed doing so. It’s even possible that he looked at the Israeli intelligence saying that Iran resumed the program in 2005 and rejected it as false. But when we remember that the three authors of the NIE are all long time foes of the Bush policy who have always denied that Iran was a threat, that becomes harder to believe.Paul T. replies:
Yes, overall I think that’s right. At the very least, the Israeli intelligence seems to deserve some acknowledgement, reply or refutation; though perhaps that’s not how it’s done.N. writes:
This all gets worse and worse. It is entirely possible, given the leadership of Iran, to see a nuclear surprise attack on Israel in less than 10 years, maybe less than 5 years, because of the incompetence and fecklessness of Western leadership going on for a decade. Such an attack would lead to the deaths of millions of people in short order.Comments added December 12 A reader writes:
Lawrence, are you accepting this claimed assessment at face value? that if Norman Podhoretz says Israeli intelligence believes Iran resumed uranium enrichment in 2005 it must be true that Iran did indeed resume enrichment in 2005?LA replies:
If there is intelligence to that effect, shouldn’t it also be considered? BTW, there was a story in today’s news that the British also believe that Iran is still actively pursuing nuclear weapons and are appalled at the U.S. report.E. writes:
I recommend the “FALL OF SAIGON” so much for U.S.diplomacy and treaties. It would do well to list the countries and states that no longer exist because they followed the U.S. to their own destruction. Israel cannot be saved period they are self destructing. The only question is how many Jews can be saved if any. As Clinton said at Rabin’s funereal “SHALOM CHAVER”Charlie M. writes:
A foreign nation might well interpret this incident to mean that the U.S. government is too busy squabbling and sabotaging itself to have any policy at all on the Iranian situation. Iran may grow more outrageous. Israel will likely conclude that she is on her own and will give herself permission to strike first. We still don’t know exactly what was bombed in Syria last month, but clearly Israel knows how to do it. So while the U.S. plays pattycake with itself in Washington, sets up new Islamic terror states in Europe at Serbia’s expense and tries to get Israel to sign suicide notes in Maryland, perhaps the envelopes containing Operation David or Operation Pharaoh are being taken out of their high security safes to be distributed to the bomber crews. So many nuclear powers live close by the neighborhood, so it’s good that everybody see us totally preoccupied with shooting ourselves in the foot.Dimitri K. writes:
I have a hypothesis, in which I don’t believe too much myself, but still there is a chance. The hypothesis is that this admission of the report by Bush is a part of the attack plan. It is to calm down Iranians, who otherwise could by more anti-aircraft missiles or temporarily dismount their equipment and hide it. So this admission by Bush of the report may have been the start of the countdown.James W. writes:
Do you know what you have said? “No matter what Bush has done, he must never be found at fault.” That was, necessarily, the role for Monarchs in their day. Advisors could be wrong; the King could not be and maintain his position of authority.James L. writes:
Maybe Bush always intended to take action against Iran, be he’s simply been boxed in by opponents in the State Department. He knows that if he tries to do anything against Iran now that the report has been published, the Democrats will have all the ammo they need to prevent him. On the other hand, if he had suppressed the report and acted, the report would have eventually come to light, and would then be the excuse for his impeachment.Ted Belman, a regular contributor at IsraPundit, writes:
I am not in agreement. It is not about whether Iran is developing nuclear weapons or not. It is about cutting a deal in the ME that will avoid a larger war.LA replies:
Can you sum up your argument for me?Ted B. replies:
Its hard to do the articles justice because they include many facts leading to the bottom line which isLA replies:
Very interesting. But your thesis fails to take account of the actual Iranian nuclear program. Why would Bush, who believes Iranians are developing nukes, suddenly stop caring about that?Ted B. replies:
You are right to point that out. Email entry |