Al Qaeda’s new strategy: low-level subversion aimed at Islamization

Amir Taheri has a significant article in the July 1 New York Post concerning a recently captured manifesto, written by al Qaeda theoretician Sheik Abu-Bakar Naji, which lays out what may be al Qaeda’s emerging strategy to achieve the Islamic domination of the world.

According to Naji as summarized by Taheri, it is impossible for jihadists to create a proper Islamic state in a single country, as long as the world is dominated by “Crusaders” who have the power to topple such a regime. Instead, the Islamic movement must go global—mounting a low-intensity war that should be extended to all places in the world that have a significant Muslim presence, including both Muslim countries and non-Muslim countries. (Taheri’s paraphrase of Naji, that jihad campaigns should be mounted wherever there is a “significant Muslim presence,” brings to mind my mantra about Islam for the last seven years: “Significant Muslim populations do not belong in any Western country, period.”) Jihadists must create parallel societies alongside existing ones. They could even exist within cities, operating as secret societies with their own rules, values and enforcement.

“The jihadis are to begin by giving areas where Muslims live a distinctly Islamic appearance, by imposing special styles of dress for women and beards for men,” Taheri writes. “Then they start imposing the shariah. In the final phase, they create a parallel system of taxation and law enforcement, effectively taking the areas out of government control…. Jihad would be everywhere, rather than in just one or two countries that the ‘infidel’ could hit with superior firepower.” Instead of large-scale terrorist attacks of the past, Naji recommends “countless small operations” that would render daily life unbearable, including “kidnappings, the holding of hostages, the use of women and children as human shields, exhibition killings to terrorize the enemy, suicide bombings and countless gestures that make normal life impossible for the ‘infidel’ and Muslim collaborators.”

Taheri’s summary of the manifesto concludes on this point:

Once parallel societies are established throughout the world, they would exert pressure on non-Muslims to submit. Naji believes that, subjected to constant intimidation and fear of death, most non-Muslims (especially in the West) would submit: “The West has no stomach for a long fight.”

Well, if Abu-Bakar’s strategy is that the jihadists blend with and dominate the Muslim areas of a non-Muslim country, in order to subvert and Islamize that country, it would become impossible for the host society to distinguish the jihadists from the other Muslims.

The proposed strategy thus underscores what I have been explicitly recommending for at least the last four years (beginning with my FrontPage Magazine article “How to Defeat in America”): the only way to remove the terrorist, jihadist, and sharia threat from the West is to initiate a steady out-migration of Muslims from the West, by a range of measures both voluntary and involuntary, until the number of Muslims in any Western country is no longer “significant.”

* * *

That’s my response to the al Qaeda manifesto. But what will be the neocons’ response? Greater efforts at democratizing the Islamic world, combined with the continued support for and ignoring of Muslim immigration into the West?

That indeed is what I predict, and I have history to back up that prediction. After the July 2005 London bombings, when it became known that Muslims who had been born and raised in democratic Britain were terrorists, neocons argued (and I wrote about this at the time) that Muslim extremism was growing in the West because it was fed by Islamic extremism at home. In other words, even though the Muslims in the West lived under democracy, and therefore should not (according to the neocon theory) become extremists, they were being influenced by Muslims living in the non-democratic Muslim world. Therefore the only way to end Muslim extremism among the immigrant populations in the West was to end Muslim extremism in the Islamic world, and the only way to end Muslim extremism in the Islamic world was to democratize the whole damned thing.

Thus, when facts clearly showed the total wrong-headedness and inadequacy of the neocons’ Muslim Democracy Project as the way to end Muslim extremism, the neocons responded by expanding the Muslim Democracy Project even further. To make the West safe, every single Muslim country had to be democratized, because as long as there was a single non-democratic Muslim society, the Muslim extremists in that country would infect the Muslims living in the democratic West. The fact that Muslims living in the democratic West had become terrorists did not interrupt for even one second the neocons’ line that democracy is the cure for terrorism. The revelation of the actual Muslim danger in the West, instead of making the neocons think of ways to protect the West from its domestic Muslims, only made the neocons look abroad.

It is therefore a reasonable assumption that the neocons’ response to Taheri’s article (and Taheri is himself a neocon, having published several cover articles in Commentary reflecting the Norman Podhoretz line to a “t”) will be what I’ve just described. The neocons will call for ever greater democratization efforts in the Islamic lands, and REMAIN STONE COLD SILENT ABOUT CONTINUING MUSLIM IMMIGRATION INTO, AND GROWING ISLAMIC NUMBERS AND POWER IN, THE WEST. Or, rather, they will mention the growth of numbers, but only as a result of high Muslim birth rates. They will never acknowledge that there would be no Muslims in the West to have a high birth rate, and no Muslims in the West to be radicalized, and no Muslims in the West to serve as the power base and concealment for jihadists, without the mass immigration of Muslims into the West that they, the neocons, have supported all along.

Below is Taheri’s article.

AL QAEDA’S PLAN B
FAILURES PROMPT NEW IDEAS FOR TERROR FROM THE SHADOWS
July 1, 2008

NO one should feel safe without submitting to Islam, and those who refuse to submit must pay a high price. The Islamist movement must aim to turn the world into a series of “wildernesses” where only those under jihadi rule enjoy security.

These are some of the ideas developed by al Qaeda’s chief theoretician, Sheik Abu-Bakar Naji, in his new book “Governance in the Wilderness” (Edarat al-Wahsh).

Middle East analysts think that the book may indicate a major change of strategy by the disparate groups that use al Qaeda as a brand name.

The Saudi police seized copies of the book last week as they arrested 700 alleged terrorists in overnight raids.

Naji’s book, written in pseudo-literary Arabic, is meant as a manifesto for jihad. He divides the jihadi movement into five circles—ranging from Sunni Salafi (traditionalist) Muslims (who, though not personally violent, are prepared to give moral and material support to militants) to Islamist groups with national rather than pan-Islamist agendas (such as the Palestinian Hamas and the Filipino Moro Liberation Front).

All five circles are at an impasse, says Naji. Some accept the status quo while hoping to reform it. Others have tried to set up governments in a world dominated by “infidel” powers, and have been forced to abandon Islamic values. Still others failed because they didn’t realize that the only way to win is through total war in which no one feels safe.

NAJI claims that the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the abolition of the Islamic Caliphate in 1924 marked the start of “the most dangerous phase in history.” Those events put all Arab countries, the heartland of Islam, under domination by the “infidel”- who later continued to rule via native proxies.

In Naji’s eyes, it is impossible to create a proper Islamic state in a single country in a world dominated by “Crusaders.” He cites as example the Taliban—which, although a proper Islamic regime, didn’t survive “infidel” attacks and opposition by Afghan elements.

Instead, he says, the Islamic movement must be global—fighting everywhere, all the time, and on all fronts.

SINCE 9/11, Islamist terror movements have been de bating grand strategy. Osama bin Laden had theorized that the “infidel,” led by the United States, would crumble after a series of spectacular attacks, just as the Meccan “infidel” government did when the Prophet Muhammad launched deadly raids against its trade routes. Yet the 9/11 attacks didn’t lead to an “infidel” retreat. On the contrary, the “Great Satan” hit back hard.

That persuaded some al Qaeda leaders that a new strategy of smaller, slower but steadier attacks was needed. Ayman al-Zawahiri, al Qaeda’s No. 2, has advocated such a strategy since 2003, arguing that the jihad should first target Muslim countries where it has a chance of toppling the incumbent regimes.

Now Naji takes that analysis a step further—suggesting that low-intensity war be extended to anywhere in the world with a significant Muslim presence.

Islamists in the “wilderness” must create parallel societies alongside existing ones, Naji says—but not set up formal governments, which would be subject to economic pressure or military attack.

These parallel societies could resemble “liberated zones” set up by Marxist guerrillas in parts of Latin America in the last century. But they could also exist within cities, under the very noses of the authorities—operating as secret societies with their own rules, values and enforcement.

But they could also take shape in Western countries with large Muslim minorities: The jihadis are to begin by giving areas where Muslims live a distinctly Islamic appearance, by imposing special styles of dress for women and beards for men. Then they start imposing the shariah. In the final phase, they create a parallel system of taxation and law enforcement, effectively taking the areas out of government control.

The “wilderness” will provide the cover for bases for jihad operations. Jihad would be everywhere, rather than in just one or two countries that the “infidel” could hit with superior firepower.

IN a notable departure from past al Qaeda strategy, Naji recommends “countless small operations” that render daily life unbearable, rather than a few spectacular attacks such as 9/11: The “infidel,” leaving his home every morning, should be unsure whether he’ll return in the evening.

Naji recommends kidnappings, the holding of hostages, the use of women and children as human shields, exhibition killings to terrorize the enemy, suicide bombings and countless gestures that make normal life impossible for the “infidel” and Muslim collaborators.

Once parallel societies are established throughout the world, they would exert pressure on non-Muslims to submit. Naji believes that, subjected to constant intimidation and fear of death, most non-Muslims (especially in the West) would submit: “The West has no stomach for a long fight.”

The only Western power still capable of resisting is the United States, he believes. But that, too, will change once President Bush is gone.

NAJI makes it clear that the United States is the chief, if not the exclusive target, of jihad at this time. He mentions Israel only once, as “America’s little female idol.” His only reference to Palestine is in a historical context.

Naji asks jihadis to target oilfields, sea and airports, tourist facilities and especially banking and financial services. He envisages “a very long war,” at the end of which the whole world is brought under the banner of Islam.

He identifies several Muslim countries as promising for establishing “the governance of the wilderness”: Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Yemen, Turkey, Jordan, Libya, Tunisia and Morocco. The implication is that “wilderness” units already exist in nations such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, Somalia and Algeria.

Naji’s theory is built on the concept of terror as the main organizing principle of the mini-states he hopes to set up everywhere in preparation for the coming Caliphate. He claims that the Prophet himself practiced the tactic by making his enemies in Medina, where he ran his version of the “wilderness,” pay “the maximum price” for any deviance, and through constant raids on trade caravans belonging to his enemies in Mecca.

IN a simple language, Naji of fers a synthesis of the themes that appeal to different jihadi groups. With anti-imperialist sentiments, missionary dreams, ethnic and class grievances and puritanical obsessions, he mixes a deadly cocktail.

Naji’s message is stark: Western civilization is doomed. Its last bastion, America, lacks the will for a long war. The “infidel” loves life and treats it as an endless feast. Jihadis have to ruin that feast and persuade the “infidel” to abandon this world in exchange for greater rewards in the next.

Amir Taheri’s next book, “The Persian Night: Iran Under the Khomeinist Revolution,” is due out this fall.

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Erich writes:

About Amir Taheri, you wrote:

“It is therefore a reasonable assumption that the neocons’ response to Taheri’s article (and Taheri is himself a neocon, having published several cover articles in Commentary reflecting the Norman Podhoretz line to a “t”) will be what I’ve just described.”

I think what motivates Taheri is more his residual Islam in his bones than the neo-conservative suit he has over the years, so to speak, fit handsomely over those bones. Hugh Fitzgerald wrote an excellent essay on Taheri in February of 2006, in which he said, among other things:

“Taheri does not avoid the subject of Islam. And sometimes he makes sense, or quasi-sense… Taheri is not exactly a Pollyanna or a Dr. Feelgood. But unwary Infidels will, if they accept what he writes, still come away with the essential message that it is those who are “perverting” a “noble religion” (perhaps Taheri would leave it at “religion”) and whose roots are shallow in Islam, and who furthermore are the uneducated, [who] are all we have to worry about.”

And:

“Taheri gets many things right. He is a truth-teller, up to a point, of the kind we are all so familiar with—Fouad Ajami and Kanan Makiya come to mind. They despise Edward Said, and despise the vulgarity of Arab political life and its despots. But they just can’t bring themselves to the point of adequately describing, truthfully describing, Islam. They have their own “dream palace”—which is of a benign Islam, compounded of those memories of elderly pious relatives (a grandmother will do), and the smells of the Iftar dinner, and the quiet piety of Muslims they had known growing up, and of course, of collective memories of some fabulously wonderful mythical Golden Age.”

Taheri’s agenda is the same as all the other Muslim reformers—to make sure that Islam remains forever detached from all substantive problems and dangers arising out of Islam. And, apparently, Taheri has found that the neo-con agenda dovetails nicely with his own more Islamic agenda.

Ron L. writes:

Is this really a new strategy by Al Qaeda, or a sign of desperation? Most of the items described are already happening, so they seem to be jumping on the bandwagon. The only thing new is the idea to cripple the West through infrastructure attacks, something I assumed would happen in 2001.

In some ways this is a good thing. It makes the slow conquest strategy explicit. It should make those who choose to see only terrorism in 9-11, and who see only poverty and despair in the French riots and rape spree in Europe, see the truth. Sadly it won’t.

I’m sure that the Western media will misreport it. To report and comment properly on it is to ask for prosecution in Europe.

LA replies:

As has been said before, under liberalism, correctly quoting a minority group is a racist act.

Posted by Lawrence Auster at July 01, 2008 11:03 PM | Send