Does victory over al Qaeda in Iraq mean victory in Iraq?

Jeffrey Kuhner, whom I never heard of before, is a columnist at the Washington Times and a true believer in unalloyed, unrevised, unregenerate Bushism/McCainism. He even subscribes to the neocons’ insane analogy of Iraq to Germany and Japan:

The troop surge has been a huge success…. The United States is now on the verge of a historic victory.

If the terrorists are defeated and Iraq becomes a self-governing democracy, the Arab world will be transformed. Iraq is the Germany or Japan of the Middle East—the strategic linchpin to wider reform. Its oil wealth, geographical location, rich cultural heritage and multiethnic, multi-religious character make it a potential model for the region. Its success will inspire people in other sclerotic, authoritarian Arab states—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria—to embrace political and economic modernization.

A democratic Iraq will form the heart of a new Middle East—one that provides a real alternative to the nihilism of radical Islam. A McCain triumph in November will represent a decisive step toward defeating Islamofascism.

Now if news reports are correct, there certainly seems to be a victory shaping up in Iraq, a victory over al Qaeda in Iraq—that same al Qaeda in Iraq that came into existence after and as a result of the U.S. occupation of Iraq and that the U.S. did basically nothing to stop for four years, because for all those years the U.S. never had a strategy to defeat Al Qaeda in Iraq but was rather engaged in a holding action, a holding action that Bush and the neocons called “war.” The radical change in U.S. strategy starting in January 2007 known as the surge (which Bush only adopted when Iraq was facing imminent catastrophe and even his staunchest supporters had turned against his policy), combined with the wholly unexpected boon that many Sunnis turned against the demonic al Qaeda, has resulted in a tremendous reversal in al Qaeda’s fortunes.

Thus Marie Colvin reports In the Times of London:

Al Qaeda in Iraq being driving back

American and Iraqi forces are driving Al-Qaeda in Iraq out of its last redoubt in the north of the country in the culmination of one of the most spectacular victories of the war on terror.

After being forced from its strongholds in the west and centre of Iraq in the past two years, Al-Qaeda’s dwindling band of fighters has made a defiant “last stand” in the northern city of Mosul.

A huge operation to crush the 1,200 fighters who remained from a terrorist force once estimated at more than 12,000 began on May 10….

The group has been reduced to hit-and-run attacks, including one that killed two off-duty policemen yesterday, and sporadic bombings aimed at killing large numbers of officials and civilians.

Now, doesn’t this good news back up Kuhner’s expectation of a “historic victory”? No, it does not. Let us suppose that the best occurs, and that al Qaeda in Iraq is defeated, meaning that it is extinguished as a fighting force. That would mean victory over al Qaeda in Iraq. It would not mean victory in Iraq. Remember that al Qaeda is but one of many factors and forces that have stood in the way of the establishment of sustainable Iraqi self-government. Get rid of al Qaeda, and there are still the timeless ethnic and sectarian divisions within Iraq’s own population, which have only been temporarily and partially tamped down by the Sunnis’ unexpected and welcome cooperation with the U.S. against al Qaeda. Once al Qaeda is gone, the Sunni-Shi’ite split will re-emerge.

An article by Sam Dagher in the July 3 Christian Science Monitor shows how U.S. soldiers and regular Iraqis see the situation:

Baghdad—After almost 15 months of its longest, deadliest, and most unconventional deployment, the 1st Battalion, 64th Armor Regiment of the US Army is packing up to leave Iraq.

When it goes home to Fort Stewart, Ga., this month, the unit will be among the last to return from the “surge,” Washington’s move to calm the sectarian bloodshed that had consumed Baghdad and much of Iraq.

In many regards, the plan worked. Violence dropped as about 30,000 extra US soldiers moved into combat outposts around Iraq starting in February 2007. Last month, the number of Iraqis killed was 515; last June, that figure was 3,000.

Still, while the 1/64 recognizes much progress during its tour, the majority of the more than dozen soldiers and officers interviewed question if their effort will have been worth it in the end. Many say their mission helped bring about only a lull in the sectarian killings and feel that neither the Iraqi government nor its forces are ready, capable, or even motivated to build on the successes of the surge.

“We have no control over what happens once we leave. No one is prepared to stay here 20 years of their lives to make sure this place stays good,” says Spc. Mark Webster, a native of San Luis Obispo, Calif., stationed at the neighborhood garrison of Adel. These combat outposts (COPS) have been scattered throughout Baghdad since the start of the surge. “We have accomplished things; we kept it at a general lull,” adds Specialist Webster.

Many average Iraqis in Adel, as well as in the areas of Jamiaa, Iskan, Khadra, Washash, and parts of Mansour, where the 1/64 operated, give credit to the US for the turnaround in their western Baghdad neighborhoods. But they fear a return to the not-so-distant days of lawlessness should US troops leave soon.

On a recent house-to-house search in Adel by members of the 1/64, accompanying Iraqi soldiers seemed more interested in chatting and texting on their cellphones than the mission at hand.

“It’s tiring. It has been five years. Now it’s called knock-and-search instead of raids. A lot of the [Iraqi] soldiers do not want to do their jobs,” grumbles Staff Sgt. Jose Benavides from Miami. “If the Americans leave, the sectarian violence will flare up.”…

In one stately Adel villa, Iman Marouf says she’s “guarding” the house for its absent Shiite owners. No Shiites have dared return to the neighborhood since a bombing last month targeted some who had come back.

“Fear consumes people. Hearts are still filled with fear,” says Mrs. Marouf, gesturing emotionally.

Her sister, Jinan Marouf, adds: “All this calm is temporary, trust me. If we get someone like Saddam Hussein back, Iraq will be itself again. We need someone with his control.”

The views of the American GIs and Iraqis in Baghdad strongly support what I have said from the time of my first article about the proposed surge in December 2006. I wrote that if our forces were increased in size and began to occupy contested areas in Iraq and keep them safe, instead of just killing insurgents and then leaving and letting the insurgents return, then of course things in Iraq would improve (just as they improved in Vietnam when the U.S. adopted a similar counterinsurgency approach under Gen. Creighton Abrams). But, I continued, as soon as the surge ended, the situation would return to where it had been before the surge. The surge would keep Iraq from dissolving into chaos for the moment, but it would not solve the Iraq problem. As I have been saying since September 2003, we have no strategy for victory in Iraq and will have to keep our forces engaged there forever, with our men being killed and maimed there forever, in order to keep the Iraqi government afloat. I’ve also said that, even if by some miracle (miracles are always possible) a self-sustaining, self-governing Iraq emerged, it would be a Shi’ite, Sharia-based government opposed to the West and everything we stand for. So what are we fighting for? When Jeffrey Kuhner compares Iraq to Germany and Japan, and announces that we are on the verge of a historic victory there, and suggests that an Iraq democracy is a real possibility along with the democratization of the entire Middle East, he is smoking the same undiluted hashish that Bush and his promoters and followers have been smoking for the last five years.

But even that is not all. It’s not only our continued military involvement that will be necessary to sustain a quasi-functioning Iraq, but much more basic types of help. Dagher continues:

On a recent drive with Lt. Col. Edward Chesney, the 1/64’s commander, through his area of operation, he recounted how the local Iraqi police unit was rebuilt from scratch in many of the mainly Sunni neighborhoods he oversees. It’s now staffed with men, some ex-insurgents, mostly on the US payroll.

He spoke of how commercial thoroughfares are being slowly revitalized with US grants to shop owners and of the public-works projects initiated and paid for by the US military.

He described with enthusiasm how US funds are being spent on creating municipal outposts, known as public-works substations, in many of these once no-go neighborhoods to encourage the Shiite-led Baghdad municipal authorities to pitch in.

But when it comes to broader Iraqi reconciliation, he says, that’s something you can’t impose. “That’s something they are going to have to work through,” he says. “I think foundations have been laid in our areas, but if progress does not continue there is potential for things to unravel again.”

Did you know that? Did you know that U.S. is not only paying the salaries of Iraqi police, but is giving money grants to Iraqis to get them to open and run small businesses? Did you know that Iraq is such a dysfunctional society that it needs us, on the other side of the world, to pay them to provide basic goods and services to their own people?

This is a non-functional country. We do not have the ability to turn a non-functional country into a functional one, and we should not be trying—especially since, if it did become functional, it would only be adding to the strength of Islam that is commanded by its god to seek our subjugation and ruin.

Below is the entire Monitor article.

A ‘surge’ unit sees change, but questions its permanence

As the US Army soldiers of the 1st Battalion, 64th Armor Regiment prepare to return home this month, many question whether the sacrifices they made will have been worth it in the end.

By Sam Dagher | Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor
from the July 3, 2008 edition

Baghdad—After almost 15 months of its longest, deadliest, and most unconventional deployment, the 1st Battalion, 64th Armor Regiment of the US Army is packing up to leave Iraq.

When it goes home to Fort Stewart, Ga., this month, the unit will be among the last to return from the “surge,” Washington’s move to calm the sectarian bloodshed that had consumed Baghdad and much of Iraq.

In many regards, the plan worked. Violence dropped as about 30,000 extra US soldiers moved into combat outposts around Iraq starting in February 2007. Last month, the number of Iraqis killed was 515; last June, that figure was 3,000.

Still, while the 1/64 recognizes much progress during its tour, the majority of the more than dozen soldiers and officers interviewed question if their effort will have been worth it in the end. Many say their mission helped bring about only a lull in the sectarian killings and feel that neither the Iraqi government nor its forces are ready, capable, or even motivated to build on the successes of the surge.

“We have no control over what happens once we leave. No one is prepared to stay here 20 years of their lives to make sure this place stays good,” says Spc. Mark Webster, a native of San Luis Obispo, Calif., stationed at the neighborhood garrison of Adel. These combat outposts (COPS) have been scattered throughout Baghdad since the start of the surge. “We have accomplished things; we kept it at a general lull,” adds Specialist Webster.

Although the experience of the 1/64 applies to only one slice of Baghdad, many of the issues and challenges it has grappled with are similar to those confronting other units in Baghdad and in other restive provinces—Anbar, Diyala, and Nineveh—where most of the surge units were deployed.

Life on the front lines

Getting US soldiers into the dusty neighborhoods of Baghdad was a cornerstone of the surge.

At COP Adel, a battered shopping center now barricaded with giant walls and nicknamed “the mall,” soldiers from the 1/64 recently milled around in front of their Humvees. Inside, others nibbled on hot meals trucked in from Camp Liberty, the battalion’s headquarters within the sprawling US command complex next to Baghdad’s airport. A few pump iron, some mop up, others surf the Internet.

“They tell us we are doing something for our country, but I do not see it,” says one soldier, who did not want to have his name published. “It seems more like the real fight is in Afghanistan … instead they get us into this [area of operation], which is more like Mr. Rogers’ neighborhood.”

Adel, a once-prosperous middle-class area, is now almost all Sunni and poor. Shiites fled the sectarian violence of 2006 and their homes have been occupied by Sunnis displaced from neighboring Hurriya. That shift is just one example of the new sectarian segregation throughout Baghdad.

Many average Iraqis in Adel, as well as in the areas of Jamiaa, Iskan, Khadra, Washash, and parts of Mansour, where the 1/64 operated, give credit to the US for the turnaround in their western Baghdad neighborhoods. But they fear a return to the not-so-distant days of lawlessness should US troops leave soon. The 1/64 is being replaced with another unit.

On a recent house-to-house search in Adel by members of the 1/64, accompanying Iraqi soldiers seemed more interested in chatting and texting on their cellphones than the mission at hand.

“It’s tiring. It has been five years. Now it’s called knock-and-search instead of raids. A lot of the [Iraqi] soldiers do not want to do their jobs,” grumbles Staff Sgt. Jose Benavides from Miami. “If the Americans leave, the sectarian violence will flare up.”

In one stately Adel villa, Iman Marouf says she’s “guarding” the house for its absent Shiite owners. No Shiites have dared return to the neighborhood since a bombing last month targeted some who had come back.

“Fear consumes people. Hearts are still filled with fear,” says Mrs. Marouf, gesturing emotionally.

Her sister, Jinan Marouf, adds: “All this calm is temporary, trust me. If we get someone like Saddam Hussein back, Iraq will be itself again. We need someone with his control.”

From the Adel outpost, the soldiers served as cop, community benefactor, and mentor to Iraq’s fledgling security forces.

On a recent drive with Lt. Col. Edward Chesney, the 1/64’s commander, through his area of operation, he recounted how the local Iraqi police unit was rebuilt from scratch in many of the mainly Sunni neighborhoods he oversees. It’s now staffed with men, some ex-insurgents, mostly on the US payroll.

He spoke of how commercial thoroughfares are being slowly revitalized with US grants to shop owners and of the public-works projects initiated and paid for by the US military.

He described with enthusiasm how US funds are being spent on creating municipal outposts, known as public-works substations, in many of these once no-go neighborhoods to encourage the Shiite-led Baghdad municipal authorities to pitch in.

But when it comes to broader Iraqi reconciliation, he says, that’s something you can’t impose. “That’s something they are going to have to work through,” he says. “I think foundations have been laid in our areas, but if progress does not continue there is potential for things to unravel again.”

The toll of multiple tours

At the 1/64’s headquarters inside Camp Liberty, framed photos pay tribute to the 12 US soldiers and one Iraqi interpreter that the unit lost during its deployment in Iraq.

Among them is Maj. Sid Brookshire, from Willard, Mo., who died June 20, 2007, when his vehicle hit a roadside bomb. Five soldiers and one interpreter died March 10, 2008, when a suicide bomber attacked them. They had been conducting an “economic assessment” in a Mansour market in order to provide local shopkeepers with grant money.

The losses quickly took their toll on the men and women of the unit, many who had already served several tours.

“At first I was shocked, because we had not had a casualty in six months. People were talking already about going home,” says the unit’s public-affairs officer, 1st Lt. Tabitha Hernandez, from Wellsville, N.Y. “The worst part for me was seeing grown-up men cry.”

She says the March attack was a “hard hit” for the platoon to which the dead officers and soldiers belonged and the battalion as a whole, which comprises a core force of about 830 plus an attachment of about 170.

Lieutenant Hernandez says nearly 40 percent of the battalion’s members are in Iraq for a third time since the start of the war in 2003. “It’s astronomical,” she says.

For Sgt. Mark Martin, a father of three from Chatsworth, Ga., on his third tour, the toll of the multiple and almost back-to-back deployments for many units is grueling. “We are so stretched that constantly, if we are not training back home, we are here.”

And many within the battalion wonder just how long the war will—or should—go on.

Maj. Chris Budihas recalls how in 2004—while he was serving in Najaf to the south—he had asked the commander of US troops in Iraq at the time, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, whether there would be an Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 12 or 13, the US military’s term for tours of duty in Iraq.

“He looked down, shifted the sand with his boots, and told me ‘maybe’,” says Major Budihas, who is finishing up his 17-month tour as part of OIF 6.

In 2007, Budihas, of Jacksonville, Fla., had already been in Iraq for three months working at division level in Baghdad but was seconded to the 1/64 after it lost Major Brookshire.

Posted by Lawrence Auster at July 06, 2008 02:33 PM | Send