Racialism

A year ago I wrote the following comment on racialism:

When I call myself a racialist I mean two things. First, that I believe that race matters in specific ways that are important to society. (Here are two simple and undeniable examples: if Chinese or black people had populated Europe instead of whites, there would have been no Western civilization as we know it; and if a society inhabited by a race with an average IQ of 100 is repopulated by a race with an average IQ of 90, that society is going to change radically in all kinds of ways.)

Second, that I care about the wellbeing of the white race, the race which created our nation and our civilization, the race which is the source of everything we are and everything we have, the race without which, it goes without saying, we ourselves would not exist.

To state openly that one believes these unremarkable, ordinary, commonsensical things, these things which in normal times and places most people would take as a given, is, in today’s mainstream society, enough to make oneself into a non-person. Such is the rule of liberalism—which will endure until enough people state openly that they don’t believe in it.

It would be interesting to see if people had arguments against racialism as I have defined it here, rather than simply automatically rejecting it.

- end of initial entry -


Gintas writes:

“It would be interesting to see if people had arguments against racialism as I have defined it here, rather than simply automatically rejecting it.”

We have been trained to thoughtstop, because it’s a thoughtcrime. When the idea is broached, everyone shuts it down in his own mind with the right liberal phrases. It works for most people.

John Dempsey writes:

Are you saying that Jared Diamond has been wrong all this time and that white achievement isn’t just a simple matter of their superior geographical environment? ;-)


Posted by Lawrence Auster at August 30, 2011 11:58 AM | Send
    

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