Ledeen may be right about this. Certainly among the Arabs there are strongly fascist overtones to the Ba’ath style of party politics. Nevertheless, recent Arab leaders have often not paid the price of defeat; indeed, sometimes defeat has seemed to help them. Think of Nasser after his defeats at the hands of the Israelis in 1956 and 1967, and of Saddam Hussein after his defeat at the hands of the Americans, et al., in 1991. (Where is that guy, anyway?) HRS

Maybe Mr. Sutherland’s idea points to a flaw in Ledeen’s analysis. The Islamists and Ba’athists may be similar to fascists, but they have an additional quality which is not related to fascism but which comes from Islam: the cult of martyrdom, of honor in defeat. However, as Mark Helprin said in the article I discussed here some time back, if we could return the Muslims to that state of honorable defeat, in which they accept the fact that they don’t have the power to act against us, that would be victory.

I am always troubled by the use of the term “fascist” which has been much abused by those on the left to attack anything or anyone they don’t like. Messrs. Ledeen and Auster appear to be using it with care, to refer to specific features of the system developed in Italy by Mussolini, and followed to some extent under Hitler in Germany. However, even then one must consider that these systems had much in common with the communist totalitarianisms - cult of the personality of the leader, and appeals to warlike spirit, both mentioned by Mr. Auster. It is of interest that both Mussolini and Hitler were heavily inspired by Marx, the former having even written a book on him, and the latter having said in conversation that everything in his system came from Marx. The use of the term fascism has also been abused to create a factitious distinction between totalitarianisms and obscure what they have in common. That is not to say there are not important differences, only that there was a tendency on the left to play up the (truly) horrific nature of the so-called fascist tyrannies which served to distract from the horrific revelations about the Soviet Union that came out just before and during WW II. I wonder whether it serves any purpose to complain about Arab states by comparing them to something else. Unless the comparison provides some particular illumination, and is more than simply a means of deprecation, perhaps it is better to avoid the comparison. For example, a comparison of general characteristics is less helpful than pointing out specific facts, such as the presence and activities in Nazi Berlin of the Grand Mufti during WW II.

Whether or not it is correct to describe Islamism as a form of fascism (and I am open on that question), does Thucydides think that fascism is a legitimate concept in political science, or not?

Fascism is certainly a legitimate concept in political science, provided it is carefully defined to refer to the system developed by Mussolini in Italy. It has however become difficult to use because of its widespread use as an all purpose term of abuse. For example, it is often applied to the Nationalist government of Franco in Spain, which, whatever its faults, was pretty clearly not modeled on Mussolini’s system. Frequently military dictatorships of all sorts are called fascist. In my view, it would be better to simply call them military dictatorships rather than throw in the term fascist and thus raise questions (often not even intended by the author) as to what similarities there were with Mussolini’s system. In fact, I think that careful study of exactly what that system was and why it had such evident appeal to many Italians at that time would be rewarding in trying to understand how such mass movements derive their power. I have been reading the superb Renzo de Felice’s “Breve Storia del Fascismo,” but don’t know of anything in English that I would recommend. The situation is the same with the history of the Civil War in Spain, where all the better histories in English have been written from a leftist perspective.

I have just found an excellent article on the web, tip of the hat to Volokh, on fascism which indicates the complexity of that subject and why we need to use the term with great care: http://www.la-articles.org.uk/fascism.htm#n47

Another common quality that might be considered is a reliance on conspiracy theories and scapegoating. I don’t know as much about Mussoulini’s tactics in this regard, but we all know about Hitler’s scapegoats, shared by Mohammedans today.

Daniel Pipes made some related observations:

“Napoleon’s conquest of Egypt in 1798 brought Muslims of the Middle East into direct and intense contact with modern Europe. After many centuries of scorning the “Franks,” Muslims watched in awe and despair as West European Christians far surpassed them in wealth and power… . In the course of the nineteenth century, they overpowered most Muslim rulers, so that by World War I, few Islamic countries still enjoyed independence.

“What then had gone wrong? How had the despised Franks surpassed the Muslims? Even today, after many decades of debate, this question has not been satisfactorily answered… . Conspiracy theories softened the blow…”

Sometimes America is the scapegoat of course. This is from Dr. Pipes’ “The Politics of Muslim Anti-Semitism.” http://www.danielpipes.org/article/161

(Though I’m unsure of his contention that anti-Semitism is something the Arabs learned from the Europeans.)

Michael Ledeen has responded to this discussion:

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Thanks for the great comments. It all helps thinking and understanding. May I point out that I worked very closely with Renzo De Felice? He came very close to believing that there was no such thing as “fascism-in-general,” but I think on this one he was just a bit too picky.

We all agree that the word has been overused (Franco was certainly not a fascist), and it’s hard to save it now from all the cultural overlay. And yet, Jim Gregor at Berkeley has done great work showing the utility of the concept both in the Middle East and in the case of the People’s Republic of China.

Nasser wasn’t defeated as Hitler and Mussolini and Tojo were defeated. He lost a battle or two, but not the whole war, which he (and Saddam in ‘91) was (foolishly) permitted to continue. That’s really grist for my mill, I think.

Michael Ledeen

———————

As Mr. Ledeen notes, Nasser’s defeats and Hussein’s 1991 defeat were different in degree from those of the Italians, Germans and Japanese in WWII. Of the Axis dictators, Mussolini was the only one removed by his own (Marshal Badoglio’s separate peace with the Allies).

Surely Nasser’s defeat in 1967 (probably in 1956, too) and Hussein’s in 1991 were total military defeats, resulting in great loss of their soldiers’ lives, and stemming directly from extraordinary misjudgment and military incompetence. They were, on any objective standard, utter humiliations not only of the dictator but of his country. Yet, in Nasser’s case, he emerged from both of his disastrous fights with the Israelis more popular than before. With that sort of attitude about their leaders, and such hatred for the perceived enemy, merely defeating Arab states on the battlefield will not lead to any change of Arab hearts or minds. Quite the contrary, perhaps. HRS

Thucydides is right on target about both the nature of European interwar fascism and the difficulty in comparing it to our present foes. It seems to me that the Baath regimes rather more resemble a road-show version of Stalinism than either German Nazism or Italian Fascism. As for Islamism, it has some resemblances to interwar fascism, yet there is a fundamental difference in its basis in traditional supernatural religion. This was lacking in European fascism, except in the Romanian Iron Guard. I don’t know that addiction to conspiracy theories really distingushes Communism from Nazism, or indeed from other political currents. Stalin’s regime manufactured “conspiracies” regularly throughout its existence. There has certainly been a remarkable rise in belief in conspiracies in the US over the last 30 years or so.

“… in Nasser’s case, he emerged from both of his disastrous fights with the Israelis more popular than before. With that sort of attitude about their leaders, and such hatred for the perceived enemy, merely defeating Arab states on the battlefield will not lead to any change of Arab hearts or minds. Quite the contrary, perhaps.”

Ok, if we DON’T defeat them, they defeat us, and then kill us, convert us, or reduce us to dhimmitude. If we DO defeat them, they get energized by a martyr complex and come back for more. What options does this leave us? We have to deprive them of the power to harm us or affect us in any way. That means defeating them militarily and politically, while also containing them in their own part of the world. Then they revert to the state they occupied for about 200 years prior to 1979 (except in the Balkans where their power over Europeans continued), of being exotics whom we can visit and study and write romances about, but who have no power or opportunity to affect us. That is the only tolerable modus vivendi I can conceive. But if this would also require some kind of continuing neo-colonialist control over the Muslim world, then it becomes very problematic how this can succeed.

The problem is so terrible, which is why, as a thought experiment, I hosted (while not endorsing) Jim Woodhill’s semi-satirical proposal of utterly destroying the Muslim culture by means of immersing them in Western pop culture.

As has rightly been pointed out, Nasser emerged from his 1956 and 1967 defeats stronger than before. This is all the more amazing when it is remembered that one of the reasons the Egyptian monarchy fell to Nasser and his Free Officers movement was the humiliating performance of the Egyptian army during the Israeli War for Independence. But at least the army led by King Farouk managed to hold the Gaza Strip, and elsewhere hold onto Egyptian territory that formerly bordered the Palestine mandate. So why did Nasser come off smelling like a rose in the eyes of his people when his defeat was so much more overwhelming?

I can see that the answer regarding the 1956 war might be that Nasser was not just up against the Israelis then, but also against the Brits and the French. The fact that he preserved Egypt’s recently-won independence against such powerful foes might explain his popularity. But I just don’t get it about 1967. He got his clock cleaned, and lost use of the canal (and its revenues) that had been the casus belli in 1956. So how did he survive that humiliation, so much greater than Farouk’s?

Echoing Seamus’ comments, I sincerely doubt that Nasser gained political strength in 1967. I think people are confusing 1967 with 1973. In the 1973 war, Israel was “on the ropes” for a while and needed U.S. military supplies airlifted to help out. That war redeemed the honor of Egypt and Jordan in the eyes of the Arab world because of the stark contrast with the disaster of 1967.

If someone can provide evidence to the contrary, I would be glad to learn.

No confusion on my part between the Six Day War of 1967 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973. They are different in some respects, as Mr. Coleman notes. They are alike in that both resulted (despite Arab propaganda) in the Israel Defence Force’s utterly defeating the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces. Hussein of Jordan had learned enough by 1973 not be lured into war as he was in 1967. The Syrians got the same treatment again in 1982. Somewhat like their American friends, the Israelis don’t seem to reap the full political benefit of their many military triumphs.

As for Nasser’s getting a political lift from the Yom Kippur War, it would have been of little use to him as he had then been dead for three years. Such undeserved credit as accrued to any Arab dictator was Sadat’s.

Mr. Auster and I agree. Middle Eastern passions and pathologies and the Moslem religion should be confined to the Middle East, for the religious, cultural and physical health of the West. Western powers need to maintain a cordon sanitaire around the region. What provoked my original comment in this thread was skepticism - based in part on the ability of such as Nasser to survive, even thrive in the wake of humiliations that would lead to their death or removal from power in sane societies - that military defeat of Moslem regimes and benevolent occupations in the Middle East will create material appreciation among Moslems of the infidels who do the defeating and occupying. HRS

A slight correction: Hussein of Jordan did provide a few units in 1973 to reinforce the Syrians on the Golan. He avoided a full commitment to that war, however, and avoided paying the price he had in 1967. Had Jordan attempted to invade in 1973, the price in Arab blood would have been huge, and there would probably be no discussion today of Israel’s ceding sovereignty over any part of Judaea and Samaria. Looked at that way, it might have been better for Israel had Jordan fully participated in the 1973 war! Forgive the digression… HRS

Yes, I was aware that Nasser was dead in 1973. It has been much remarked that the Camp David accords were only possible because Egypt/Sadat had saved face somewhat in 1973; negotiating these accords between 1967 and 1973 would have been impossible.

I would still like to see some reference to an authoritative source that confirms that Nasser gained popularity for the disaster of 1967, in which huge losses were suffered and great amounts of territory were lost, and Egypt and Jordan never had the upper hand even for a day. I think this is important, because if Arabs are that nonsensical, then my hope that they will ever become civilized becomes nil.

Nasser was able to get out of responsibility for the 1967 debacle by claiming that the United States and Britain had ACTIVELY participated in the air campaign, and it was really they who were responsible for the Israeli victory. I would not be surprised if many Arabs still believe this.

As I understand it, in 1967, after Israel had basically annihilated the entire Egyptian Air Force which were mostly still on the ground, Egypt announced in broadcasts that a major defeat had been inflicted on Israel and the Jews were retreating on all fronts.

Jordan, believing this silliness, then decided to enter the war despite fulsome pleas from Israel to desist, for which Jordan lost the Old City and the entire West Bank.

Perhaps this is another characteristic of fascism? The inability to tell the truth no matter that failure to do so won’t get you anywhere and may even cause a bigger disaster. Yes, mein Fuhrer, our illustrious troops at Stalingrad are marching to glorious victory for the Fatherland — any moment now!

And if one of your ‘allies’ gets clobbered as a result of the useless misinformation, too bad for them.

The terminology of ‘fascism’ is problematic for other reasons. It seems to make distinctions between different manifestations of utopian, dictatorial ideologies when the differences themselves are less significant than the similarities.

Thus we refer to Il Duce and Der Fuhrer as Fascist, but where does this leave the good, kindly Uncle Joe Stalin?

The use of the term “fascist” would seem to single out certain forms of totalitarianism disfavored by the Left, while avoiding mention of the communist ones. However, all the forms of totalitarianism that characterized the 20th century had in common the exaltation of the collectivity over the individual and employed the charisma of a Supreme Leader to this end. I continue to dislike the use of the term “fascist” as a general term of deprecation, and take heart from Mr. Ledeen’s pointing out that Renzo de Felice (perhaps the best authority on fascism, having written a magisterial 8 volume biography of Mussolini) was close to thinking there was no such thing as fascism in a general sense.

What is Ledeen’s answer to these questions:

1. Why do we continue to allow Islamic immigration into the USA?
2. What is Ledeen’s answer to Fourth Generation Warfare, which is what we are facing in Iraq?
3. Is Ledeen aware that the Islamicists use immigration into Western countries to build political power to subvert these countries?

Fourth Generation Warfare is the term used By William S. Lind, meaning war without the state involved. Lind recently asked this question of a prominent neocon, as he described on the free congress site. The neocon didn’t know what he was talking about, despite the daily news from Iraq.

I’ve asked Ledeen about immigration, and it doesn’t seem to come within his view. When he had an exchange with me at Front Page last year, he seemed to think I was talking only about illegal immigration (!), and agreed with me that that was a problem. In other words, he seemed to have no conception that immigration was even an issue. He thinks that if people are unhappy about immigration policy, that still should have no effect on what we need to do about the terror masters, which I think is a reasonable point as far as it goes, but still fails to address the problem.

I’m not aware that he has ever replied to questions 2 and 3. You should write him and see what he has to say.

On the question of facsism, if the idea of the collectivity and the role of the charismatic leader in channeling it are not unique to fascism, then what about (1) the idea of the deed, that people realize themselves through action; and (2) the idea of corporatism, with business and government working closely together, so that the society forms a monolithic ideological whole, though without direct government ownership? Are those distinct to fascism?

I would like to hear Mr. Ledeen’s views on immigration as well. The blindspot that people have on this question is simply astonishing.

On Fascism, First Things ran a thoughtful and informative piece on it several years ago:

http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft0005/reviews/anderson.html